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Non-technical summary
The impact of the EU Cohesion Policy has mainly been evaluated by analysing
its growth effects. However, this perspective neglects that the EU support
might affect other policy fields as well.
There are at least two reasons why the impact on public investment should
be of special interest. First of all, according to the principle of addition-
ality the Member States have to co-finance EU-funded projects but must
not crowd out spending for national public investments elsewhere. Second,
since a major part of Cohesion Policy payments is spent on government in-
vestments, virtually all empirical studies on the investigation of the growth
effects assume that the Cohesion Policy increases investments leading to a
higher steady-state capital stock per capita, which, in turn, increases the
GDP growth rate. Hence, an essential condition for the effectiveness of EU
transfers is the degree to which they affect overall national public invest-
ments. However, the impact of Cohesion Policy payments on national public
investments has not yet been evaluated.
Furthermore, instead of increasing future-orientated spending, EU Cohe-
sion Policy payments may (indirectly) be used to reduce public deficits. This
is possible if EU regional policy crowds out national spending, which is most
likely to occur in poorer countries. To the best of our knowledge, there has
been no paper investigating the effects on public deficits.
Against this background, the paper at hand examines through which
channels this policy field works by analysing the impact of EU Cohesion Pol-
icy payments on national public investments and primary budget balances.
In doing so, we use a comprehensive dataset of 27 EU countries, extend the
time period of investigation to 1982-2006 and apply advanced panel econo-
metric methods.
Our results indicate that EU Cohesion Policy payments do not signifi-
cantly increase national public investments, thus pointing to a crowding out
of national spending. Moreover, the hypothesis that EU funds are used for




Bisher wurde die Koha¨sionspolitik der Europa¨ischen Union (EU) nahezu
ausschließlich im Hinblick auf ihre Wachstumswirkungen untersucht. Diese
Fokussierung vernachla¨ssigt, dass die EU Koha¨sionspolitik ebenfalls auf an-
dere Politikfelder einwirken kann.
Es gibt mindestens zwei Gru¨nde weshalb der Einfluss auf o¨ffentliche In-
vestitionen von besonderem Interesse ist. Erstens mu¨ssen die EU Mitglied-
staaten die von der EU gefo¨rderten Projekte kofinanzieren, wobei diese
Fo¨rderung gema¨ß dem Additionalita¨tsprinzip die staatlichen Investitionen
nicht verdra¨ngen darf. Zweitens wird ein Großteil der Koha¨sionspolitik im
Bereich staatlicher Investitionen (wie bspw. Verkehrsinfrastruktur) ausgege-
ben. Daher basieren nahezu alle Studien, welche die Wachstumswirkungen
der EU Koha¨sionspolitik untersuchen, auf der Annahme, dass die Koha¨-
sionspolitik die Investitionen erho¨ht, die wiederum im Steady State zu einem
ho¨heren Kapitalstock pro Kopf fu¨hren und somit die Wachstumsrate des BIP
beeinflussen. Folglich ist eine notwendige Bedingung fu¨r die Wirksamkeit
der EU Transfers, dass sie die gesamten o¨ffentlichen Investitionen erho¨hen.
Jedoch wurde der Einfluss der EU Koha¨sionspolitik auf die staatlichen In-
vestitionen bisher nicht evaluiert.
Daru¨ber hinaus ko¨nnte es sein, dass die EU Koha¨sionspolitikzahlungen
statt zur Erho¨hung der Investitionen (indirekt) dazu verwendet werden, die
o¨ffentlichen Haushaltsdefizite zu verringern. Dies ist mo¨glich, sofern die
EU Koha¨sionspolitik nationale Ausgaben verdra¨ngt, was insbesondere im
Falle a¨rmerer Mitgliedsstaaten (und den Zahlungen aus dem so genannten
Koha¨sionsfonds) denkbar ist. Unseres Wissens gibt es bisher keine Studie,
welche die Wirkungen der Koha¨sionspolitik auf die o¨ffentlichen Haushalte
untersucht.
Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es das Ziel dieser Studie, den Einfluss der
Zahlungen der EU Koha¨sionspolitik auf die o¨ffentlichen Investitionen sowie
die Haushaltsdefizite zu analysieren. Hierzu wird ein umfassender Datensatz
von 27 EU La¨ndern verwendet, die Untersuchungsperiode auf den Zeitraum
1982-2006 ausgedehnt und panelo¨konometrische Methoden angewendet.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die EU Koha¨sionspolitik die o¨ffentlichen
Investitionen nicht signifikant erho¨ht, was auf eine Verdra¨ngung nationaler
Ausgaben hindeutet. Daru¨ber hinaus kann die Hypothese, dass die EU
Fo¨rderung zur Konsolidierung der o¨ffentlichen Haushalte verwendet wird,
nicht in allen o¨konometrischen Spezifikationen verworfen werden.
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Abstract
The impact of EU Cohesion Policy has mainly been evaluated with regard
to its growth effects. We extend the perspective by investigating the impact
of EU Cohesion Policy on public investments and budget deficits in order to
learn more about the channels through which this policy field works. Using
a dataset of 27 EU countries for the time period 1982-2006, we find that
EU Cohesion Policy payments do not cause public investments to increase
significantly, which points to a crowding out of national investment. More-
over, the hypothesis that EU Cohesion Policy is used for the consolidation
of public budgets cannot be completely rejected.
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1 Introduction
The debate on the impact of the EU Cohesion Policy (CP) has intensified
over the last decade.1 Many papers investigate if CP payments promote
growth and convergence. Nevertheless, the results are not clear-cut: While
some authors find evidence for a positive relation (Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger,
2005), others find no evidence (Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2007) or even nega-
tive support for this (Eggert, von Ehrlich, Fenge and Ko¨nig, 2007). All in all,
the discussion might be summarised by stating that the EU CP is only con-
ditionally effective. Given the quality of the institutional setup (Ederveen,
de Groot and Nahuis, 2006), decentralised governmental structures (Ba¨hr,
2008) or depending on which Objective is analysed (Mohl and Hagen, 2008),
the CP has a positive impact on growth (a literature survey can be found in
Hagen and Mohl, 2010).2
The strong focus on growth neglects the fact that the EU Regional Pol-
icy might have an influence on other policy fields as well. There are at least
two reasons why the impact on public investments might be of special in-
terest. First of all, according to the principle of additionality the Member
States have to co-finance EU funded projects but must not crowd out in-
vestment spending elsewhere (European Commission, 2007). Second, since a
major part of the Cohesion Policy is spent on public investments (European
Commission, 2004), virtually all empirical studies on the investigation of the
growth effects assume that Cohesion Policy increases investments, leading to
a higher steady-state capital per capita, which, in turn, increases the GDP
1The terms “EU Cohesion Policy” and “EU Regional Policy” can be used synonymously.
Both mean the policy of the EU to co-finance national projects mostly carried out at the
regional level by payments from the so-called “structural funds” (Ederveen, de Groot and
Nahuis, 2006).
2Besides econometric studies evaluating Cohesion Policy directly, there is empirical evi-
dence on the convergence of EU countries and regions (see Eckey and Tu¨rk (2006) for a
survey). Most studies find a small convergence rate of all or some European regions. The
effect of EU membership (again, without taking Cohesion Policy directly into account) is
analysed by Cuaresma, Ritzberger-Gru¨nwald and Silgoner (2008). They find EU mem-
bership to have a positive effect on long-term economic growth, which is relatively higher
for poorer countries.
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growth rate.3 Hence, an essential condition for the effectiveness of EU trans-
fers is the degree to which they affect overall public investments. However,
the impact of Cohesion Policy payments on national public investments has
not yet been evaluated. One paper empirically analyses the principle of ad-
ditionality based on another approach. Using a cross-section of European
regions, Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij and Nahuis (2002) investigate the im-
pact of being an Objective 1 region (that is, being eligible for the highest
transfers) on national regional support. They find that, on average, one euro
cohesion support crowds out 17 cents of national regional policy.
Furthermore, instead of increasing future-orientated spending, EU Cohe-
sion Policy payments may (indirectly) be used to reduce public deficits. This
is possible if EU funds crowd out national spending, which is most likely to
occur in poorer countries. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no
paper investigating the effects on public deficits.
Against this background, this paper analyses how the EU Cohesion Pol-
icy works by extending the current literature with regard to at least three
aspects: First, we investigate the effects of EU Cohesion Policy on additional
(fiscal) outcome variables, namely on public investment and public deficits.
Second, we use a more comprehensive dataset comprising total EU Cohesion
Policy payments. Third, we extend both the time period of investigation to
the period 1982-2006 and the number of countries to an EU-27 sample. Our
results show no significantly positive effects on national public investments
and some weak evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the CP payments
are used for public budget consolidation.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the dataset
used and discuss the main econometric approach. Section 3 presents the
econometric specifications and the empirical results. Finally, section 4 con-
cludes.
3CP payments may influence long-run growth in two more ways (Esposti and Bussoletti,
2008; Bouvet, 2005). First, it may increase the initial level or the growth of the total
factor productivity (TFP). Second, it may affect the labour market, that is, the initial
workforce growth rate, which, in turn, has an impact on the steady-state output level.
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2 Database and econometric approach
We investigate our research question using an EU-27 annual country dataset
consisting of total EU Cohesion Policy payments for the time period 1982-
2006 (European Commission, 2008). This contains the different structural
funds4 as well as the Cohesion Fund and the Instrument for Structural Poli-
cies for Pre-accession (ISPA) for the accession countries. A detailed descrip-
tion of the institutional setup can be found, among others, in European
Commission (2007).
Figure 1 shows the historical development displaying the total nominal
EU Cohesion Policy payments (vertical bars) and their shares relative to
the EU-GNI (solid line) and to the public national spending (dotted line). It
becomes clear that there is a long-term upward trend in payments when mea-
sured in absolute terms, which can be explained, inter alia, by the enlarge-
ment steps of the EU (Heinemann, Hagen, Mohl, Osterloh and Sellenthin,
2009). By contrast, payments measured in percent of EU-GNI and public
national spending have almost consistently stagnated since 1993. Further-
more, Figure 1 shows that – on average – Cohesion payments do not seem
to be very large compared to total public spending totalling approximately
0.65 percent in 2007.
Table 1 compares the expenditures for the EU Regional Policy with the
national public investments and the primary surpluses. It becomes clear
that Cohesion payments per GDP are quite important compared to total
public investments in the so-called “old” (Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portu-
gal) and the “new” (Eastern European Member States) cohesion countries.
This indicates that it may indeed be hard for some countries to absorb the
transfers and to co-finance European projects without cutting expenses else-
where. Furthermore, it may be appealing for these countries in particular
to reduce public deficits (increase primary surpluses) by displacing national
funded projects by EU-funded projects.
Generally, we are keen on the estimation of “policy reaction” functions.
4These are the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund
(ECP), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG).
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Figure 1: Development of total EU Cohesion Policy payments
Source: European Commission (2008).
Since the level of CP commitments is decided for several years in advance
within so called “financial frameworks”, national governments can anticipate
and react instantaneously to the forthcoming EU support. As a consequence,
we include the contemporaneous CP variable, i.e. not lagged, in the regres-
sion model.
In order to render the empirical results as robust as possible, we use dif-
ferent samples and methodological approaches. Regarding the choice of the
countries, we use two different samples. First, the regressions are estimated
for the whole time period for which data is available (“all time periods”).
Thus, countries are included even before their accession. For example, Aus-
tria and Finland are included even before 1994 and the Eastern European
countries before 2004. Since the latter countries also received EU support
before their accession, it is (potentially) possible to distinguish between the
“EU effect” and the “CP payments effect”. Second, we only include the
time periods in which the countries are members of the EU (“only EU mem-
bers”). By definition, the second strategy reduces the number of observations
significantly.
Concerning the econometric approaches, we start the estimation using
a simple fixed effects estimator. We report standard errors to be robust to
4
serial and spatial correlation, following Driscoll and Kraay (1998).5 The error
structure is then assumed to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and possibly
correlated between the countries (panels). Since these standard errors have
not been very common in applied work yet, we also report – as a kind of
robustness check – the White-Huber robust standard errors (White, 1980).
Due to the structure of our dataset (depending on the specification, N
varies between 25 and 27, T varies between 2 and 27 with an average of 17.1),
simply applying a fixed effects estimator in a dynamic setup leads to the
well-known Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). One way to control for this is to use
the first-differenced GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Since this estimator has been found to have a large finite sample bias and poor
precisions when the time series are persistent, we use, whenever possible, the
two-step system GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator by Blundell and Bond (1998).
In addition, using the SYS-GMM estimator has the advantage of taking into
account potential endogeneity of further explanatory variables, i.e., there
may be unobserved variables simultaneously affecting the independent and
the dependent variables. The consistency of the SYS-GMM estimator is
based on large N, which is obviously not given in our application. However,
recent Monte Carlo simulations show that, given the predetermined variables
in X, the SYS-GMM estimator has a lower bias and higher efficiency than
the first-differenced GMM or the fixed effects estimator (Soto, 2006). The
small N leads to a further problem: it is not possible to use the full set of
instrumental variables since Windmeijer (2005) or Roodman (2009b) show
that using too many instruments leads to biased results. For this reason,
only recent values up to three lags are used. For a small panel size, Soto
(2006) shows that not using all potentially available instruments does not
decrease the reliability of the SYS-GMM estimator.
Furthermore, in order to mitigate the problem of too many instruments
in the case of the SYS-GMM specification, we transform all our variables
into deviations from time means, which is equivalent to the inclusion of time
dummies. This decreases the total number of instruments and increases the
degrees of freedom (Bond, Hoeffler and Temple, 2001). Instead of using all
possible instruments for each available time period, we “collapse” the matrix
5The Stata command xtscc implemented by Hoechle (2007) is applied.
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of instruments and only use the lags up to t− 2 which leads to a smaller set
of instruments. In addition, regarding the two-step SYS-GMM estimations,
the standard errors are corrected following Windmeijer (2005).6
Another estimation strategy to deal with the Nickell bias is to apply the
bias-corrected least square dummy variable (LSDVc) estimator proposed by
Kiviet (1995) and extended by Bruno (2005a,b) to unbalanced panel data,7
which turns out to have better properties in the case of small N (Bruno,
2005a; Judson and Owen, 1999). An obvious drawback of this estimator
is the assumption of strict exogeneity of all explanatory variables (except
for the lagged dependent variable). The standard errors of the LSDVc are
bootstrapped (500 replications).
Due to our long time series, which comprises more than 20 years, our
results might be affected by the problem of non-stationarity. Hence, we run
Fisher type unit root tests for panel data following Maddala and Wu (1999).8
The results reject the null hypothesis that the main variables of interest (CP
payments per GDP, public investment per GDP and primary surplus per
GDP) are non-stationary for all countries.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Effects on national public investments
We start our empirical analysis by investigating whether and to which ex-
tent EU Cohesion Policy payments lead to higher national public invest-
ments. Put differently, we evaluate if Cohesion payments are “additional”,
or if they only lead to a displacement of national public investments. In fact,
the Member States’ obligation to co-finance projects by the principle of ad-
6The Stata command xtabond2 implemented by Roodman (2009a) is applied.
7The Stata command xtlsdvc implemented by Bruno (2005a) is applied. The SYS-GMM
estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) is used to initialize the bias correction. The accuracy
of the approximation is up to O(1/NT 2).
8The Stata command xtfisher implemented by Scott Merryman is used. Results are avail-
able upon request.
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ditionality9 should ensure that an increase in European payments promotes
domestically-financed investments, thus causing total national public invest-
ments to increase as well. Generally, the principle of additionality implies
that EU funds can only be paid in addition to the Member States’ invest-
ments and not instead of it. In practice, however, additionality is hard to
control and, more importantly, it has not been sanctioned in the past. This
leads to the suspicion that Cohesion payments displace at least some part of
the domestic public investments.
The econometric analysis of national public investments (pinvit) is based
on a similar specification to the one by Mehrotra and Va¨lila¨ (2006) for Euro-
pean countries. An obvious problem may arise from the fact that we do not
observe all possibly relevant variables that determine the scale and timing of
national public investments. For example, not only macroeconomic variables
are relevant, but also unobserved variables such as government programmes
and country specific peculiarities (e.g., natural disasters etc.). Since these
variables may simultaneously affect CP payments, their omission may lead
to biased estimates. In order to deal with this problem, we follow, inter alia,
Nunziata (2005) by using a very flexible specification, where not only fixed
country effects (µi) and fixed (annual) time effects (λt) are included, but also
country-specific linear time trends (ti). In this manner, we intend to control
for unobserved fixed and time varying heterogeneity that affects all outcome
variables apart from CP payments. Note that country-specific time trends
are not possible for the SYS-GMM estimator since this would inflate the IV
matrix. We estimate following model:
pinvit = β0 + α pinvit−1 + β1 dit−1 + β2 git−1 + β3 gdppcit−1 + β4EUit
+ β5 cpit + β6 contribit + β7 liit + β8 openit−1 + β9 electit
+ β10 leftit + γiti + µi + λt + εit
(1)
The motivation for this specification is as follows. Since public debt
(dit−1) indicates the need for consolidating public finance, it should have a
9According to the principle of additionality, the EU transfers complement the contributions
of the Member States rather than reducing them. Disregarding special exceptions, the
Member States must maintain public spending at a level no less than that reached in the
preceding period (European Commission, 2007).
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negative impact on public investments. The growth rate of real GDP per
capita (git−1) serves as a business cycle indicator.10 The level of real GDP
per capita (gdppcit−1) controls for the hypothesis that demand for public
investments may depend on the income level. Moreover, real GDP per capita
is the most important allocation criteria for CP. The long-term interest rate
(liit) is a proxy for the opportunity costs of public investments, while openit−1
(export plus imports per GDP) controls for the possibility that the demand
for public investments may depend on the openness of the economy. In the
case of the sample “all time periods” the dummy variable EUit controls for
possible membership effects.
Moreover, there is evidence that political economic variables might have
an impact on the dependent variable (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Tabellini
and Alesina, 1990). Thus, we include two further control variables as a proxy
for political effects: electit−1 measures the percentage share of pre-election
months in each election year and leftit gives the cabinet composition (Social
Democratic and other left parties in percent of total cabinet posts).
Moreover, contribit are total contributions from the national Member
States to the EU (total revenues of the EU from so-called own resources)
in percentage of GDP. This variable controls for the fact that payments to
the EU may limit the fiscal scope of national governments. Furthermore,
the national claims for payments from the EU may simply be determined by
the Member States’ considerations with regard to their net contribution to
the EU budget (the difference between what the countries pay into the EU
budget and what they receive from EU policies).11 cpit measures total CP
payments to country i in percent of GDP. Eventually, the lagged dependent
variable (pinvit−1) controls for the path dependency of public investment.
The description and the summary statistics of the variables used can be
found in Table 2 and Table 3 in the Appendix.
The estimation results can be found in Table 4. As mentioned above, we
10On the one hand, it has a positive effect on public investments if the amount of public
investments depends on tax revenues. On the other hand, the government may conduct
an anti-cyclical policy, which leads to a negative effect.
11contribit and cpit are weakly positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.14
(p-value 0.008) in our sample.
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differentiate between two samples (“all time periods” and “only EU mem-
bers”). Furthermore, various estimators are applied. Columns (1) and (5)
contain static fixed effects estimators restricting to zero, where the displayed
standard errors are either White-Huber robust or specified following Driscoll
and Kraay (1998). Column (2) shows the results of fixed effects estima-
tors applied to a dynamic specification. Since the latter strategy leads to
the Nickell bias,12 we also present the results of the bias-corrected dummy
variable estimator (LSDVc) in columns (3) and (6). Finally, in columns (4)
and (7) the results of the SYS-GMM specifications are shown, which allow
for endogeneity of dit−1, gdppcit−1, contribit, and cpit (besides pinvit−1). As
mentioned above, the SYS-GMM specification should be interpreted with
caution, since N may be too small.
Table 4 shows that many of the estimated coefficients of the covariates
have the expected signs. An increasing stock of public debt (dit−1) (with the
exception of the SYS-GMM specifications) leads to less public investments,
which corresponds to the findings of Mehrotra and Va¨lila¨ (2006). By con-
trast, the effect of a rise in the opportunity costs (real interest rates liit)
is less clear, suggesting that cost considerations seem to play only a minor
role in government investment decisions. While GDP growth (git−1) affects
public investments positively, indicating a pro-cyclical behaviour, the GDP
level (gdppcit−1) has (with one exception) a negative effect.13 Moreover, we
find significant robust results in all specifications for the lagged dependent
variable and the public debt. The political variables also have the expected
sign and the coefficient of leftit is statistically significant, whereas election
years do not have a significant impact. Contributions to the EU (contribit)
do not seem to reduce public investments.
Generally, the results do not change significantly when standard errors
are specified according to Driscoll and Kraay (1998). The disregard of the
Nickell bias in column (2) leads, as expected, to an underestimation of the
12Since T varies between 3 and 31 with an average of 16.3, the bias may still be substantial
(Judson and Owen, 1999).
13This result is in contrast to the one by Mehrotra and Va¨lila¨ (2006). They interpret their
result of a positive effect of the output level as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that
public investments have characteristics of a luxury good.
9
lagged dependent variable. Moreover, the decrease of the sample size to the
case of EU members only does not lead to different conclusions. Instead, the
signs and the significance levels remain stable regardless of the choice of the
specification.
The focus of our investigation lies on the Cohesion Policy variable. As
Table 4 shows, all coefficients of cpit are far from being significant. This is
true for all econometric techniques and both samples. The estimated long-
term effects of ĉpit (β̂5/(1− α̂)) are not shown since they are far from being
significantly different from zero.
In order to validate our results we run further sensitivity analyses. First,
one may argue that using country-specific time trends may lead to an “over-
specification” in the sense of multicollinearity with other explanatory vari-
ables or the possibility that the variance of the dependent variable is “ab-
sorbed” to a large extent. For this reason, Table 5 in the Appendix shows the
results when country-specific time trends are omitted. Note that the SYS-
GMM models in the paper already omit the country-specific time trends so
that these sensitivity analyses do not include SYS-GMM models. It can be
seen that the basic results do not change.
Second, we exclude the political variables (electit,leftit) as well as the
contributions to EU (contribit) in order to receive a more parsimonious es-
timation. The regression output displayed in Table 6 shows that this leaves
our main finding untouched: cpit is still not significant.
Third, the governments might not have complete knowledge on the future
CP payments, e.g. due to problems in absorbing total structural funds. Thus,
we re-run the regressions using lagged CP variables (cpit−1), which does not
change our key message (Table 7).
Fourth, in the SYS-GMM specifications we assumed that apart from the
lagged dependent variable, only Cohesion Policy and the contributions to the
EU are endogenous, which allows for a very parsimonious use of instruments.
Nevertheless, the cpit−1 variable is still far from being significant.14
Finally, some empirical applications question the superiority of the SYS-
GMM estimator mainly because the additional instruments might not be
valid (Lucchetti, Papi and Zazzaro, 2001). As a consequence, we use the first-
14These results are not shown, but are available upon request.
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differenced GMM estimator as an alternative estimator and again instrument
dit−1, gdppcit−1, contribit and cpit−1 (besides pinvit−1), using a lag-limit and
the collapse option. Again, the effect of cpit is zero (Table 8).
Summarising the results, no statistically significant positive effect of EU
Cohesion Policy on national public investments can be detected, irrespective
of which sample and which method is used. As a consequence, it cannot
be ruled out that CP simply serves as a substitute for domestically-financed
investment projects.
3.2 Effects on national primary budget balances
After having found that, on average, EU Cohesion Policy does not have any
measurable positive impact on public investments, we now analyse how Mem-
ber States might make use of their increased financial scope. One possibility
is that the resources are used for reducing public deficits.
In order to analyse this hypothesis, we use the primary budget balances
as the dependent variable. The primary budget balance is the difference be-
tween non-interest spending and total revenues. It can be affected by the
government much more rapidly than the total budget surplus, since it ex-
cludes interest payments, which are exogenous for the government in the
short-run. Furthermore, by using this variable, a clear-cut theoretical foun-
dation is available (Bohn, 1998).
One would expect the CP payments, ceteris paribus, to have a nega-
tive impact on primary surplus if countries co-finance projects by additional
means without altering the structure of public spending (government con-
sumption versus investment). By contrast, if national spending were cut,
CP payments would have a positive impact. The mean primary balances as
percent of GDP of the EU countries can be found in Table 1.
A framework for explaining public debt policy is formulated by Bohn
(1998). This approach explains the primary budget balance as percent of
GDP (balit) by the public debt stock (as percent of GDP) at the beginning
of the period (dit−1) as well as further variables in a time series context.15
15If the estimated coefficient of dit−1 is positive, i.e., there is a positive response of the
primary surplus to the debt-GDP ratio. As shown by Bohn (1998), this implies that
11
In the following, this concept is applied to our panel of countries and the
research goal at hand:
balit = β0 + α balit−1 + β1 dit−1 + β2 git−1 + β3 gdppcit−1 + β4EUit
+ β5 cpit + β6 contribit + β7 liit + β8 openit−1 + β9 electit
+ β10 leftit + γiti + µi + λt + εit
(2)
In fact, this specification is rather similar to the one applied to the public
investment decision above. Again, it is controlled for country-specific linear
time trends (ti). A description of the variables used can be found in Table 4 in
the Appendix. The long-term interest rate (itit) is a proxy for the opportunity
costs of public debt, whereas openit−1 (export plus imports per GDP) controls
for the possibility that the governments of more open economies choose a
more restrictive fiscal policy. Again, it is controlled for the income level and
GDP growth (gdppcit−1,git−1). Higher contributions to the EU (contribit)
may imply higher budget deficits. With regard to political considerations,
the variables electit and leftit are included once again.
The estimation results are shown in Table 9. Again, different samples
and various econometric techniques are applied. Columns (1) and (5) show
the results of static fixed effects models assuming strict exogeneity of all
regressors. Furthermore, ignoring the “Nickell bias”, column (2) includes the
results of a dynamic fixed effects specification. Columns (3) and (6) display
the results of the LSDVc (see last subsection). In columns (4) and (7), SYS-
GMM models additionally allow for endogeneity of dit−1, git−1, gdppcit−1,
contribit and cpit, whilst omitting country-specific time trends (ti).
First we take a look at the control variables. The coefficient of dit−1 has
the expected positive sign which is not statistically significant from zero in
the case of the SYS-GMM only. Hence, on average, high public debt brings
(or forces) governments to generate higher primary surpluses. In some speci-
fications, the same holds true for the long-term interest rate (liit). Economic
growth (git−1) helps to increase the primary surplus. Ultimately, election
years (electit) are associated with reduced budget surpluses, which is well
the fiscal policy is sustainable in that it satisfies an intertemporal budget constraint.
However, since the estimated coefficient here is an (unweighted) average of N different
countries, it is not relevant to this issue.
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documented in the literature (see, for example Shi and Svensson, 2003, for
an overview). The effect of the contributions to the EU (EUit) is not clear-
cut.
With regard to the estimated coefficients of cpit, it can be seen that CP
payments have a significantly positive impact on primary surpluses in the
case of fixed effects specifications. However, the significances vanish using
the LSDVc and the SYS-GMM. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that countries
use the CP payments to indirectly reduce their deficits cannot be rejected,
since we would otherwise have expected to find a negative effect.
Again we run several robustness regressions (without county-specific time
trends, without contribution payments to the EU and political variables,
lagged CP instead of contemporaneous CP, one-step FD-GMM instead of
two-step SYS-GMM). The results can be found in Appendix (Tables 10 –
13). Again, the results hardly change: No significantly negative impact of
CP payments can be detected.
4 Conclusion
The previous studies analysing the impact of EU Cohesion Policy have mainly
focused on the investigation of its economic growth effects and have mainly
led to inconclusive results. In this paper we broaden this perspective in at-
tempting to analyse through which fiscal channels the EU Cohesion Policy
works or does not work. We investigate the impact of Cohesion Policy pay-
ments on public investment and on primary budget balances by estimating
policy reaction functions. In doing so, we use more appropriate data within
a greater time span, applying advanced panel data methods.
Our results show that EU Cohesion Policy payments do not seem to
increase public investments in the EU countries, indicating a crowding out
process of national spending. Furthermore, the hypothesis that EU funds
are used for the consolidation of public budgets cannot be rejected in all
econometric specifications.
Our findings have at least two implications. First, they might explain the
mixed results of previous growth studies on Cohesion Policy, which are al-
most exclusively based on the assumption that EU Regional Policy increases
13
investments, which – at least at the national level – seems not to be the case.
Second, the policy conclusions are that the principle of additionality (stating
that domestically funded projects must not be displaced by EU projects)
should be monitored and sanctioned more carefully in order to ensure that
Cohesion Policy payments lead to higher public investments.
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Appendix
Table 1: EU Cohesion Policy payments, national public investments and
primary budgets as percent of GDP
EU CP Public Primary Time period
payments investments balance from ...
(as % of GDP) (as % of GDP) (as % of GDP) until 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria 0.13 1.59 1.17 1995
Belgium 0.10 2.12 3.38 1982
Bulgaria 1.00 3.62 3.40 2000
Czech Republic 0.07 3.26 0.76 2000
Cyprus 0.34 4.39 -3.10 2002
Denmark 0.08 1.84 5.03 1982
Estonia 0.93 4.13 1.61 2000
Finland 0.21 2.71 4.60 1995
France 0.13 3.21 -0.33 1982
Germany 0.12 2.16 0.78 1982
Greece 1.53 3.00 0.57 1982
Hungary 0.54 3.85 -2.19 2000
Ireland 1.34 3.12 3.25 1982
Italy 0.24 2.69 0.96 1982
Latvia 1.69 2.87 -0.59 2000
Lithuania 1.09 3.34 -0.58 2000
Luxembourg 0.09 4.17 2.58 1990
Malta 0.25 4.31 -1.00 2002
Netherlands 0.06 3.28 2.00 1982
Poland 0.58 3.41 -1.55 2000
Portugal 2.19 3.45 0.31 1986
Romania 0.59 3.52 -0.35 2000
Slovak Republic 0.59 2.53 -2.46 2000
Slovenia 0.27 3.37 -0.39 2000
Spain 0.84 3.76 1.85 1986
Sweden 0.10 3.13 3.67 1995
UK 0.15 1.83 0.83 1982
Notes: Own calculations based on European Commission (2008). We restrict the statistics
to the years in which positive CP payments are observable; the earliest year is 1982.
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Table 2: Definition of the variables
Variable Definition Source
pinv Gross fixed capital formation of the general AMECO
government (as % of GDP)
bal General government primary balance (as % of OECD
GDP)
d General government gross financial liability WEO
(as % of GDP)
li Real long-term interest rate in percent AMECO
open Openness of the economy (imports plus exports WEO
as % of GDP)
g Growth of real GDP per capita WDI
gdppc/1,000 Level of real GDP per capita in Dollar in PPP WDI
elect Share of pre-election months in each year Armingeon et al. (2008)
left Cabinet composition: Social-Democratic and Armingeon et al. (2008)
other left parties as % of total cabinet posts,
weighted by days
EU Dummy for membership in the EU
cp Total EU Cohesion Policy payments (as % of European Commission (2008)
nominal GDP) and WDI
contrib National payments to the EU (revenues of the EU European Commission (2008)
from so-called own resources) (as % of and WDI
nominal GDP)
Notes: WDI = World Development Indicators (Worldbank); WEO = World Economic Outlook (IMF);
AMECO = Annual Macro-Economic Database of the European Commission, DG ECFIN; OECD = OECD
Economic Outlook Database; Armingeon et al. (2008) = Armingeon, Gerber, Leimgruber and Beyeler
(2008).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample
Variable Number Mean Std. Min. Max.
of obs. dev.
pinv 439 2.99 0.88 0.67 5.13
bal 406 1.34 2.96 -8.17 11.62
d 439 56.54 28.55 4.06 134.16
li 439 7.82 3.84 3.30 27.53
open 439 91.34 52.24 35.89 347.18
g 439 2.60 2.50 -6.75 12.31
gdppc/1,000 439 23.70 10.86 0.43 112.81
elect 439 0.15 0.28 0.00 1.00
left 439 39.87 37.00 0.00 100.00
EU 439 0.79 0.41 0.00 1.00
contrib 439 7.36 4.19 0.00 15.12
cp 439 0.47 0.69 0.00 3.50
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Table 4: Determinants of national public investments
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc SYS- FE LSDVc SYS-
stat. dyn. GMM stat. GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pinvit−1 0.461 0.622 0.639 0.639 0.63
(7.11) (13.86) (4.49) (10.54) (4.06)
[4.86]
dit−1 -0.038 -0.02 -0.015 -0.012 -0.041 -0.017 -0.016
(-10.24) (-5.95) (-4.67) (-2.25) (-10.90) (-3.90) (-1.97)
[-11.77] [-5.86] [-11.18]
liit -0.02 -0.019 -0.021 0.025 -0.01 -0.011 0.029
(-1.42) (-1.63) (-0.97) (-1.28) (-0.57) (-0.37) (-1.46)
[-0.98] [-1.34] [-0.38]
openit−1 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001
(1.19) (0.57) (0.64) (0.75) (0.89) (0.25) (0.34)
[1.18] [0.76] [0.83]
git−1 0.017 0.02 0.021 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.011
(1.40) (1.76) (1.52) (0.31) (0.14) (0.53) (0.58)
[1.78] [2.11] [0.15]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.019 -0.011 -0.009 0.005 -0.016 -0.004 -0.003
(-2.64) (-1.78) (-0.50) (0.53) (-1.97) (-0.18) (-0.58)
[-2.62] [-1.90]
cpit -0.133 -0.035 -0.029 0.026 -0.063 0.032 -0.003
(-1.49) (-0.52) (-0.38) (0.14) (-0.63) (0.34) (-0.01)
[-1.60] [-0.68]
contribit 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.005 0.042 0.034 0.071
(0.69) (0.87) (0.86) (1.02) (1.98) (1.60) (1.61)
[0.43] [0.66]
electit 0.029 0.062 0.073 0.069 -0.011 0.027 0.032
(0.45) (1.24) (1.27) (1.33) (-0.16) (0.34) (0.74)
[0.50] [1.35]
leftit 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002
(3.05) (2.35) (1.27) (1.23) (3.48) (1.78) (1.25)
[3.04] [2.48]
EUit 0.234 -0.069 -0.135 -0.313
(-0.69) (-0.37) (-0.68) (-0.60)
[0.90] [-0.43]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 (time demean) 0.000 0.000 (time demean)
Time trend specific specific specific no specific specific no
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. instrum. 40 39
Hansen (p-value) 0.988 0.946
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.296 0.43
R2 (within) 0.692 0.761 0.678
No. of countries 27 27 27 27 25 25 25
No. of obs. 439 436 436 408 347 347 320
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
Table 5: Determinants of national public investments (without country-
specific time trend)
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc FE LSDVc
stat. dyn. stat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pinvit−1 0.685 0.782 0.757
(16.4) (21.27) (16.16)
[14.38]
dit−1 -0.017 -0.008 -0.007 -0.018 -0.008
(-6.88) (-4.24) (-3.55) (-7.17) (-3.40)
[-5.63] [-4.92 ] [-5.49]
liit -0.046 -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.005
(-3.62) (-2.20) (-1.39) (-0.88) (-0.30)
[-3.20] [-2.45] [-0.55]
openit−1 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001
(2.66) (1.01) (1.25) (2.02) (0.79)
[2.09] [1.30] [1.45]
git−1 0.014 0.024 0.026 0.001 0.022
(0.94) (2.14) (2.03) (0.04) (1.36)
[1.23] [2.94] [0.05]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.029 -0.007 0.022 -0.031 -0.006
(-7.86) (-2.06) (0.3) (-8.62) (-0.98)
[-7.56] [-2.16] [-8.42]
cpit -0.007 0.042 0.021 -0.202 -0.024
(-0.08) (0.73) (0.3) (-1.90) (-0.29)
[-0.07] [1.48] [-1.64]
contribit 0.062 0.033 0.032 0.094 0.043
(2.6) (1.97) (1.84) (4.2) (1.48)
[1.93] [1.85] [2.68]
electit 0.103 0.111 0.113 0.069 0.051
(1.04) (2.02) (1.98) (0.73) (0.59)
[1.40] [2.19] [0.92]
leftit 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.26) (1.89) (1.19) (0.19) (0.59)
[1.91] [1.65] [0.12]
EUit -0.471 -0.329 -0.315
(-2.11) (-2.17) (-1.88)
[-2.64]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time trend no no no no no
R2 (within) 0.372 0.703 0.416
No. of countries 27 27 27 25 25
No. of obs. 439 436 436 347 331
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
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Table 6: Determinants of national public investments (without contributions
to the EU and political variables)
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc SYS- FE LSDVc SYS-
stat. dyn. GMM stat. GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pinvit−1 0.512 0.678 0.77 0.691 0.723
(5.69) (15.54) (8.42) (11.68) (6.62)
[6.02]
dit−1 -0.034 -0.016 -0.011 -0.01 -0.038 -0.012 -0.012
(-4.09) (-4.57) (-3.50) (-2.89) (-4.72) (-3.14) (-2.49)
[-10.57] [-5.26] [-11.27]
liit -0.02 -0.017 -0.018 0.007 -0.023 -0.016 0.017
(-0.73) (-1.30) (-3.50) (0.68) (-0.54) (-0.52) (0.98)
[-0.87] [-1.25] [-0.80]
openit−1 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.23) (-0.65) (-0.73) (-0.18) (-0.49) (-0.88) (-0.11)
[-0.16] [-0.49] [-0.37]
git−1 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.017 0.008 0.016 0.014
(1.26) (2.58) (1.96) (1.79) (0.28) (0.93) (0.92)
[2.32] [2.71] [0.49]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.022 -0.012 -0.009 0.007 -0.023 -0.006 0.009
(-2.19) (-2.65) (-0.58) (0.97) (-1.56) (-0.32) (1.19)
[-2.73] [-2.05] [-2.22]
cpit -0.134 -0.047 -0.037 0.01 -0.079 0.022 -0.074
(-0.59) (-0.38) (-0.48) (0.08) (-0.30) (0.26) (-0.48)
[-1.36] [-0.84] [-0.67]
EUit 0.367 0.063 0.015 0.029
(1.18) (0.44) (0.12) (0.52)
[1.93] [0.67]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 (time demean) 0.000 -0.798 (time demean)
Time trend specific specific specific no specific specific no
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.955
No. instrum. 33 32
Hansen (p-value) 0.777 0.923
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.27 0.999
R2 (within) 0.689 0.779 0.647
No. of countries 27 27 27 27 27 25 27
No. of obs. 466 463 463 435 374 356 362
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
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Table 7: Determinants of national public investments (lagged CF variable)
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc SYS- FE LSDVc SYS-
stat. dyn. GMM stat. GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pinvit−1 0.462 0.624 0.792 0.636 0.518
(7.11) (13.85) (5.13) (10.49) (3.48)
[4.91]
dit−1 -0.038 -0.02 -0.015 -0.005 -0.041 -0.017 -0.015
(-10.42) (-5.92) (-4.59) (-0.53) (-11.01) (.3.91) (-3.34)
[-11.54] [-5.83] [-11.11]
liit -0.022 -0.019 -0.02 0.011 -0.013 -0.012 0.031
(-1.53) (-1.66) (-0.96) (0.46) (0.729 (-0.38) (1.01)
[-1.05] [-1.33] [-0.47]
openit−1 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.001
(1.29) (0.6) (0.64) (0.39) (0.98) (0.23) (0.37)
[1.26] [0.77] [0.90]
git−1 0.016 0.020 0.021 -0.01 0.002 0.011 0.001
(1.28) (1.72) (1.52) (-0.40) (0.1) (0.6) (0.05)
[1.77] [2.07] [0.12]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.018 -0.011 -0.009 0.036 -0.017 -0.005 0.003
(-2.59) (-1.68) (-0.47) (1.15) (-2.08) (-0.23) (0.25)
[-2.59] [-1.92] [-1.71]
cpit -0.122 -0.026 -0.019 -0.281 -0.087 0.112 -0.252
(-1.36) (-0.38) (-0.22) (-0.94) (-0.90) (0.12) (-0.94)
[-1.30] [-0.45] [-0.85]
contribit 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.087 0.046 0.035 0.116
(0.83) (0.88) (0.87) (1.48) (2.14) (1.68) (2.2)
[0.56] [0.70] [1.51]
electit 0.03 0.062 0.074 0.122 -0.013 0.028 0.026
(0.48) (1.24) (1.26) (2.32) (-0.20) (0.36) (0.49)
[0.52] [1.34] [-0.21]
leftit 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002
(3.32) (2.45) (1.43) (0.67) (3.7) (1.75) (2.34)
[3.18] [2.62] [3.11]
EUit 0.194 -0.077 -0.141 -0.555
(0.93) (-0.42) (-0.70) (-1.48)
[0.79]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 (time demean) 0.000 0.000 (time demean)
Time trend specific specific specific no specific specific no
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. instrum. 34 33
Hansen (p-value) 0.919 0.55
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.382 0.619
R2 (within) 0.691 0.762 0.679
No. of countries 27 27 27 26 25 25 25
No. of obs. 439 436 436 408 347 331 294
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
Table 8: Determinants of national public investments (one-step first-
differenced GMM instead of SYS-GMM )
























Time dummies yes yes
(p-value) (time demean) (time demean)
Time trend no no
No. instrum. 34 33
Hansen (p-value) 0.998 0.576
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.399 0.509
No. of countries 26 25
No. of obs. 381 294
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise.
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Table 9: Determinants of primary budget balances
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc SYS- FE LSDVc SYS-
stat. dyn. GMM stat. GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
balit−1 0.561 0.725 0.765 0.754 0.729
(11.01) (15.33) (9.13) (12.84) (6.09)
[7.14]
dit−1 0.088 0.073 0.063 0.010 0.128 0.067 0.016
(4.07) (4.51) (3.83) (0.29) (6.91) (3.62) (0.40)
[4.71] [5.09] [11.49]
liit 0.130 0.168 0.198 0.108 0.166 0.288 0.058
(1.16) (1.4) (1.68) (1.32) (1.22) (2.14) (0.63)
[1.20] [1.65] [1.54]
openit−1 -0.035 -0.027 -0.030 0.011 -0.014 -0.020 0.005
(-2.41) (-2.17) (-2.11) (0.82) (-0.95) (-1.24) (0.39)
[-2.05] [-2.63] [-1.07]
git−1 0.270 0.213 0.207 0.141 0.074 0.120 0.201
(3.61) (3.09) (3.66) (0.96) (0.83) (1.69) (2.53)
[4.59] [3.95] [1.17]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.031 -0.071 -0.109 -0.161 -0.092 -0.120 -0.043
(-0.41) (-0.72) (-0.93) (-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.02) (-0.54)
[-0.51] [-0.91] [-1.25]
cpit 1.510 0.620 0.425 -1.610 1.289 0.138 -0.090
(5.07) (1.92) (1.07) (1.39) (4.17) (0.37) (1.01)
[6.80] [2.39] [7.19]
contribit 0.184 0.060 0.0270 -0.217 0.090 0.030 0.109
(1.63) (0.79) (0.31) (0.66) (0.71) (0.27) (0.65)
[1.92] [0.59] [1.05]
electit -0.253 -0.636 -0.726 -0.990 0.002 -0.436 -0.695
(-0.80) (-2.65) (-2.49) (-3.68) (0.01) (-1.33) (-3.00)
[-0.94] [-4.23] [0.01]
leftit 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.001





Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 (time demean) 0.000 0.000 (time demean)
Time trend specific specific specific no specific specific no
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. instrum. 35 34
Hansen (p-value) 0.725 0.892
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.539 0.738
R2 (within) 0.588 0.735 0.661
No. of countries 27 27 27 26 25 25 25
No. of obs. 406 400 400 373 329 311 300
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
Table 10: Determinants of primary budget balances (without country-
specific time trend)
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc FE LSDVc
stat. dyn. stat.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
balit−1 0.670 0.768 0.811
(17.43) (20.45) (16.98)
[12.41]
dit−1 0.014 0.022 0.022 0.026 0.024
(1.21) (3.05) (2.41) (2.2) (2.87)
[0.91] [2.98] [1.41]
liit 0.058 0.084 0.104 0.101 0.196
(0.61) (1.07) (1.58) (0.88) (2.46)
[0.48] [1.13] [0.71]
openit−1 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 0.009 0.001
(0.23) (-0.49) (-0.44) (0.83) (0.06)
[0.22] [-0.52] [0.79]
git−1 0.345 0.178 0.169 0.182 0.108
(4.69) (2.68) (3.54) (2.04) (1.87)
[4.23] [3.08] [1.86]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.02 0.003 -0.124 -0.052 -0.051
(-0.30) (0.05) (-0.20) (-0.75) (-0.79)
[-0.29] [0.06] [-0.69]
cpit 0.916 0.290 0.316 0.581 -0.263
(2.64) (1.05) (1.00) (1.50) (-0.86)
[2.96] [1.33] [1.94]
contribit 0.199 0.007 -0.017 0.009 -0.026
(1.8) (0.11) (-0.22) (0.83) (-0.28)
[1.44] [0.09] [1.24]
electit -0.341 -0.772 -0.817 -0.232 -0.57
(-0.96) (-3.18) (-2.90) (-0.64) (-1.84)
[-1.12] [-4.80] [-0.77]
leftit 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.13) (-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.01) (-1.25)
[0.08] [-1.27] [-0.90]
EUit -1.217 0.158 0.346
(2.64) (0.23) (0.49)
[-0.88] [0.20]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time trend no no no no no
R2 (within) 0.3526 0.683 0.3608
No. of countries 27 27 27 25 25
No. of obs. 406 400 400 329 311
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
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Table 11: Determinants of primary budget balances (without contributions
to the EU and political variables)
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc SYS- FE LSDVc SYS-
stat. dyn. GMM stat. GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
balit−1 0.551 0.708 0.779 0.732 0.73
(6.46) (15.67) (10.78) (13.29) (8.03)
[7.20]
dit−1 0.088 0.067 0.056 0.03 0.119 0.059 0.063
(2.28) (3.41) (3.62) (1.39) (7.08) (3.83) (1.78)
[-5.03] [-4.59] [-9.80]
liit 0.104 0.11 0.144 0.024 0.198 0.302 -0.031
(0.95) (0.94) (1.51) (0.52) (1.61) (2.41) (-0.40)
[-0.96] [-1.13] [-0.28]
openit−1 -0.024 -0.011 -0.013 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.007
(-0.78) (-0.72) (-1.00) (0.95) (0.28) (0.04) (0.45)
[-1.16] [-0.79] [-0.28]
git−1 0.286 0.199 0.19 0.171 0.092 0.116 0.15
(2.28) (2.46) (3.29) (1.63) (1.05) (1.57) (1.41)
[-4.42] [-3.52] [-1.33]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.014 -0.012 -0.05 -0.114 -0.105 -0.103 -0.001
(-0.11) (-0.15) (-0.51) (-1.22) (-1.77) (-0.92) (-0.01)
[-0.20] [-0.16] [-1.51]
cpit 1.537 0.711 0.528 -1.291 1.25 0.182 -0.509
(3.78) (3.40) (1.68 (-1.48) (4.32 (0.53 (-0.48)
[-6.58] [-2.92] [-5.74]
EUit 0.656 0.258 0.15 1.45
(1.12) (0.46) (-0.29) (-1.55)
[-1.02] [-0.64]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(p-values) 0 0 0 (time demean) 0 0 (time demean)
Time trend specific specific specific no specific specific no
(p-values) 0 0 -0.248 0 -0.929
No. instruments 29 28
Hansen (p-value) 0.503 0.343
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.743 0.629
R2 (within) 0.57 0.717 0.641
No. of countries 27 27 27 27 27 25 27
No. of obs. 433 427 427 400 356 336 325
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
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Table 12: Determinants of primary budget balances (lagged CF variable)
All time periods Only EU members
FE FE LSDVc SYS- FE LSDVc SYS-
stat. dyn. GMM stat. GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
balit−1 0.568 0.733 0.686 0.76 0.627
(11.00) (15.28) (7.76) (13.01) (8.62)
[7.68]
dit−1 0.09 0.072 0.06 0.079 0.129 0.064 0.09
(4.18) (4.38) (3.63) (1.8) (6.92) (3.37) (2.76)
[4.83] [5.13] [11.44]
liit 0.13 0.147 0.177 -0.001 0.187 0.275 -0.051
(1.18) (1.23) (1.53) (0.01) (1.38) (2.00) (0.38)
[1.14] [1.45] [1.70]
openit−1 -0.04 -0.029 -0.03 -0.021 -0.02 -0.019 -0.026
(-2.64) (-2.27) (-2.13) (-1.02) (-1.33) (-1.21) (-1.62)
[-2.22] [-2.81] [-1.39]
git−1 0.283 0.221 0.216 0.03 0.1 0.129 0.069
(3.71) (3.13) (3.79) (0.29) (1.13) (1.84) (0.70)
[4.10] [3.84] [1.59]
gdppcit−1/1, 000 -0.042 -0.077 -0.124 -0.095 -0.098 -0.132 0.009
(-0.52) (-0.77) (-1.03) (-0.45) (-1.40) (-1.12) -0.08
[-0.66] [-0.96] [-1.22]
cpit 1.181 0.264 0.083 -0.844 1.023 -0.091 -0.308
(3.24) (0.79) (0.21) (-0.61) (2.97) (-0.23) (-0.8)
[3.63] [1.27] [3.60]
contribit 0.169 0.065 0.036 -0.403 0.072 0.039 -0.549
(1.46) (0.83) (0.41) (-1.76) (0.56) (0.35) (-1.99)
[1.82] [0.60] [0.81]
electit -0.269 -0.634 -0.72 -0.998 0.057 -0.426 -0.614
(-0.85) (-2.62) (-2.48) (-3.74) (0.18) (-1.32) (-2.78)
[-0.95] [-4.18] [0.22]
leftit -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001
(-0.40) (-1.84) (-1.34) (0.48) (-1.95) (-1.89) (-0.24)
[-0.30] [-1.74] [-2.02]
EUit -0.391 0.055 4.208
(-0.35) (0.06) (2.27)
[-0.51] [0.05]
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 (time demean) 0.000 0.000 (time demean)
Time trend specific specific specific no specific specific no
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No. instrum. 35 34
Hansen (p-value) 0.823 0.743
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.313 0.555
R2 (within) 0.580 0.732 0.656
No. of countries 27 27 27 26 25 25 25
No. of obs. 406 400 400 373 329 311 300
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise: FE: (White-Huber robust s.e.) /
[Driscoll-Kraay s.e.]; LSDVc: 500 bootstrap replications.
Table 13: Determinants of primary budget balances (one-step first-
differenced GMM instead of SYS-GMM )
























Time dummies yes yes
(p-value) (time demean) (time demean)
Time trend no no
No. instrum. 29 28
Hansen (p-value) 0.762 0.657
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.290 0.815
No. of countries 26 25
No. of obs. 347 275
Notes: t-values in parentheses if not stated otherwise.
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